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ABSTRACT 
This research aimed to test the previous result of experimental research on decision making 
by Dilla and Steinbart (2005), and to internalize the result in the context of a local government 
hospital in Indonesia. The subjects in this experiment were 80 members of the House of 
Representatives in the Cilacap, Brebes and Purbalingga regions in Indonesia. They were asked 
to evaluate the performance of a fictitious local government hospital and decide whether or not 
to increase its budget allocation for the coming year. Half of the subjects were given instruction 
in the performance measures applicable to hospitals; the other half proceeded straight to the 
experimental task. The first group were labelled “knowledgeable users”; the latter group were 
classified as “unknowledgeable”. 
The results of this experiment using real decision makers showed that the knowledgeable 
group tended to use the unique information given to them to measure performance and make 
budget allocation plans, whereas the unknowledgeable group used common measures. These 
results are consistent with Lipe and Salterio (2000), Dilla and Steinbart (2005) and Bawono et 
al. (2012), indicating that students may be reliable surrogates for real decision makers. 
Keywords:  accountability, public sector, performance measurement, budget allocation plan, 
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INTRODUCTION 
This research focused on which performance 
measures decision makers used in order to deter-
mine the success of public sector organizations 
in Indonesia. Most organizations, not only in the 
private sector but also in the non-profit and 
public sectors, have performance assessment 
mechanisms to assess whether the organization 
has been running on track or needs to improve 
its performance. Performance has traditionally 
been measured in financial terms, comparing the 
budget that has been set with actual realization. 
In recent years, private sector organizations have 
been developing and using more comprehensive 
performance measurement systems, incorporat-
ing both financial and non-financial measures. 
One of these systems, using both financial 
and non-financial measures, is the Balanced 
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Scorecard (BSC). To test whether users of the 
BSC understood the various measures and used 
them equally in evaluating performance, Lipe 
and Salterio (2000) designed an experiment in 
which MBA students evaluated the relative 
performance of two companies by examining 
their BSCs. Two of the measures for each 
perspective of each BSC were the same (called 
common measures); the other two measures for 
each perspective only appeared on one com-
pany’s BSC and were specific (unique) to the 
strategy, product and market of that particular 
company. The other company had a different set 
of unique measures. When the participants eva-
luated which of the two companies had per-
formed better, they only focused on the common 
measures, as comparisons were easier, even 
though the unique measures were indicating 
better performance for the other company. 
Dilla and Steinbart (2005) wondered whether 
part of the reason for Lipe and Salterio’s find-
ings was that the student participants had no 
prior experience with the BSC, that is, they were 
“unknowledgeable”. Dilla and Steinbart repeated 
the experiment using accounting and information 
systems students who had studied and tried de-
signing BSCs. They found that these participants 
did consider the unique measures as well as the 
common measures, but they still put more 
weight on the common measures in evaluating 
the performance of each company. 
Royal et al. (2013) explained leadership in 
public sector organizations as requiring a high-
level understanding of power. Public sector 
organizations invest more in human resources 
rather than in profits. Hence, this sector offers a 
major source of theoretical and empirical under-
standing of the role of the formation of know-
ledge and organizational learning. Learning 
competencies, in particular, are more imperative 
in the non-profit environment. For example, the 
significant stakeholders’ management of public 
sector organizations makes them more vulnera-
ble to conflicts between the organization and the 
staff as a result of this ambiguity. Barriers to 
organizational learning are important because 
such barriers provide a detailed classification of 
the competencies required for learning. The 
process to overcome such barriers to learning 
needs to be investigated, especially in public 
sector organizations. Barriers include; a lack of 
trust, the lack of employee skills to implement 
innovations and also the lack of ability by the 
management to institute learning experiences 
impacts on the learning organization, which 
requires extraordinary dexterity to make it work. 
In public sector organizations, where budgets 
are discretionary and allocated by the govern-
ment, performance measurement may be used to 
evaluate whether the budgeted allocation of 
funds for the next year will be revised upwards, 
remain the same or even be cut. This perfor-
mance measurement is mandatory in Indonesia 
(Government of the Republic of Indonesia Regu-
lation No. 71/2010). Measurements will be car-
ried out carefully by the legislature (such as the 
local regional representatives) as the stakehold-
ers who represent the people. Yudono (2002) 
claimed that parliament can only play its role 
properly if the leaders and members have the 
necessary qualifications, levels of education and 
experience in politics and government to under-
stand and carry out their duties and responsibili-
ties. 
Bawono et al. (2012) focused on the role of 
information and knowledge in the public sector 
decision making process in the context of gen-
eral hospitals. The experiments were carried out 
using students as surrogates for the govern-
ments’ representatives on the hospital boards. 
One group of participants was first given instruc-
tion in various performance measures unique to 
the evaluation of hospitals. Both the group given 
the information and the other group were then 
asked to evaluate the performance of a fictitious 
hospital and decide whether to increase the 
budget for the next year or leave it the same. The 
group that was given the extra instruction tended 
to use the information unique to hospitals as a 
basis for their decisions about the budget alloca-
tion for the next year, while the group that was 
not given instruction tended to use only the gen-
eral information as a basis for making decisions, 
even when they were provided with both the 
common and unique measures. 
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These three studies reviewed above all used 
students as surrogates for the decision makers. 
Bawono et al. (2012) raised the question of 
whether real decision makers would make simi-
lar decisions, as they would have different edu-
cational backgrounds and more experience than 
young students, many of whom would not have 
worked full time. Therefore this study repeats 
the experiment carried out in Bawono et al. 
(2012), but using a sample of members of the 
local government, participants who would have 
to make decisions about budget allocations in 
real life. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESES 
Libby (1993) suggested a simple model for 
the acquisition of knowledge and skills which 
determined the performance capabilities and 
instructions, experience and ability to determine 
the acquisition of knowledge, therefore known 
as the ‘Knowledge acquisition theory’. The most 
important implication of the model was a 
detailed understanding of the process of the 
acquisition of knowledge that was required be-
fore the practical implications of the study were 
clear. 
Furthermore, the quantity and quality of 
training and the feedback were varied. Good 
practice and feedback should be considered as 
part of the "experience." In this study, research-
ers focused on the acquisition of knowledge 
through various combinations of instructions 
which were then considered part of the "expe-
rience". Performance evaluations of public sec-
tor organizations in Indonesia commonly com-
pare the budget with the actual performance. 
However, this traditional view of performance 
only considers the use of financial inputs. It does 
not take into consideration outputs and out-
comes, and whether inputs have been used effec-
tively as well as efficiently and economically 
(Hyndman and McGeough, 2008). Effectiveness 
pays attention to the relationship between out-
puts or outcomes and organizational goals. For 
example, if the goal of a public sector organiza-
tion is to reduce infant mortality by 10 percent 
within a year, measurements of the effectiveness 
of performance will compare the actual results 
with that objective. Output and outcome 
measures are likely to be unique to each 
organization, and non-financial. 
Performance measurement and budget 
allocation planning that is used in many public 
sector organizations emphasizes the common 
measurement rather than considering the unique 
measurement. Common measurement is a mea-
surement commonly used by all units/work 
units, while the unique measurements are 
measurements used by a unit/specific work unit. 
In contrast to the emerging paradigm, it empha-
sizes both measurements as a single unified inte-
grated process. 
Budget allocation planning is one part of 
public sector budgeting. Budget allocation plans 
delineate the level of monetary resources that 
will be used in a program or by an organizational 
unit in order to carry out their plans and achieve 
their outcomes. Therefore the criteria that deci-
sion makers use in their resource allocation 
determination are really important. Decision 
makers use performance information to deter-
mine whether the allocation of the budget for the 
coming year will be raised, lowered or remain 
the same. 
Yudono (2002) claimed that members of the 
local regional representatives would be able to 
exercise their rights properly, carry out their 
tasks and duties effectively and play their part in 
decision making if each member had sufficient 
knowledge of the technical concepts of gover-
nance and public policy. Knowledge is required 
for supervising local government finances; in 
particular, knowledge about budgeting. Most 
previous studies have found that the regional 
members’ knowledge about the budget affects, 
or has a relationship with, the regions’ financial 
supervision (Sopanah, 2003; Werimon, 2003; 
Coryanata, 2007; Winarna and Murni, 2007; 
Basri, 2007).1 
There are differences in the ability of mem-
bers to read and analyse performance reports. 
Some decision makers in government have a lot 
of experience and understanding of performance 
reports, while others do not. Research into other 
accounting fields, such as auditing, has found 
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that more knowledge results in better decision 
making (Bonner, 1990). Knowledge of different 
types of performance measures can be provided 
through training, courses, books, seminars and 
scientific journals. In this research, knowledge 
was provided to some decision makers to see if 
that made them more aware of important parts of 
the performance report in making their decisions. 
This test is stated in the following hypotheses: 
H1:  Decision makers who are knowledgeable 
about performance measurement will make 
different appraisals of performance to those 
of unknowledgeable decision makers. 
H2:  Decision makers who are knowledgeable 
about performance measurement will make 
different budget allocation decisions than 
the unknowledgeable decision makers. 
Performance reports produced by govern-
ment organizations typically contain both the 
common and unique performance measures of a 
unit. For example, from hospitals, the house 
receives both financial and non-financial perfor-
mance reports, each containing common and 
unique measures. Decision makers pay attention 
to these performance measures and then con-
clude whether a hospital’s performance is good 
or bad. This research concerns how decision 
makers use both of these common and unique 
performance measures. 
Dilla and Steinbart (2005) hypothesized that 
decision makers, who understand the theory as 
well as the structure of the BSC, would be more 
likely to use both common and unique measures 
when comparing and evaluating performance. 
However, their results showed that even though 
unique measures were considered, more weight 
was placed on the common measures. Other stu-
dies (for example, Libby et al., 2004; Gagne et 
al., 2006) have found that decision makers who 
have had experience with performance reports, 
and their common and unique performance 
measures, use both types of measures, but they 
give more emphasis to the unique measures than 
the common ones. To further test these conflict-
ing findings, the following hypotheses were 
developed: 
H3:  Decision makers who have access to both 
common and unique information will make 
different appraisals of performance than the 
decision makers who have access to only 
the common information. 
H4:  Decision makers who have access to both 
common and unique information will make 
different budget allocation decisions than 
decision makers who have access to only 
the common information. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Public sector accounting research uses an 
experimental method with its emphasis on 
strengthening internal validity. This does not 
mean that external validity is not of concern, as 
it is. Nahartyo (2013) argued that research focus-
ing on the experimental method could still be 
said to be rare in the context of Indonesia. More-
over, research that has focused on the field of 
performance measurement and budget allocation 
planning, in the realm of the public sector by 
using the experimental method is still very rare 
within the Indonesian context.  
This study used a 2 x 2 factorial design with 
one factor for the type of information (common 
or unique) and one factor for knowledge (know-
ledge is given or knowledge is not given). 
Within-subject design compared the effects of 
different treatments on different subjects. This 
method was selected because it was able to test 
the interaction effect of independent variables on 
the dependent variable and it avoided a demand 
effect, in which the subjects know the direction 
of the given treatment (Campbell and Stanley, 
1966; Nasution and Supriyadi, 2007). 
The 80 subjects in the study were members 
of the Regional House of Representatives 
(abbreviated to DPRD in Indonesian) in the 
Central Java districts of Cilacap, Brebes and 
Purbalingga in Indonesia. These subjects would 
be making decisions related to performance 
measurements and budget allocation plans in 
their roles as members of the regional 
parliament. The subjects received a snack, lunch 
and a book as compensation for their 
participation. 
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The experiment used the same procedure and 
instruments as in Bawono et al. (2012), as 
summarized here. The subjects were divided into 
four different groups. Groups A1 and A2 were 
given brief training on common and unique per-
formance measurement for an hour. During the 
short course, the subjects were given instruction 
in performance measurement, the budget alloca-
tion process, how to read and interpret the finan-
cial statements of public hospitals, and the im-
portance of using some measurements that are 
unique to the assessment of performance. After a 
few minutes to absorb the training, these “know-
ledgeable” groups proceeded to the experiment. 
Groups B1 and B2, the “unknowledgeable” 
groups did not receive any training. 
In the experiment itself, participants were 
given budget reports for two fictitious regional 
public hospitals, either Hospital 1 or Hospital 2. 
Hospital 1’s report comprised of its budget and 
actual figures for revenue and expenditure (five 
common types of information). Hospital 2’s 
report comprised of the same two measures of 
common information as for Hospital 1, plus 
three measures of unique information, namely, 
performance ratios for the Bed Occupancy Rate 
(BOR), Length of Stay (LOS) and Bed Turn 
Over (BTO). Thus there were four groups of 
subjects, divided according to whether or not 
they had received the training (A or B), and 
according to which hospital report they ex-
amined (1 or 2) (see Table 1). 
Subjects from both group A and group B 
were asked to read and to review the information 
related to the performance of either Hospital 1 or 
Hospital 2, and then provide an assessment of 
the hospital’s performance and propose a budget 
allocation for the coming year. Each hospital’s 
performance was assessed on a scale from "Did 
not meet budget", through "Met budget", to 
"Above budget". Assessment of each hospital’s 
performance was the basis for the decision to 
increase, maintain or decrease its budget for the 
next year. Subjects were given a maximum of 30 
minutes to provide a decision on the hospital’s 
budget allocation. 
After the experiment, the subjects filled in a 
short questionnaire to check whether they 
understood the forms given to them and the 
experimental task, and to collect demographic 
data, namely, gender, education level and age. 
Table 2 shows that the treatment group (those 
given the training) and the control group (those 
without the training) were similar in respect to 
gender. 
Table 2. Participants by Gender 
Gender 
Group 
Total Treatment Control 
Male 30 28 58 
Female 10 12 22 
Total 40 40 80 
Table 3. Participants by Level of Education 
Gender 
Group 
Total Treatment Control 
High School 8 5 13 
Diploma 10 12 22 
Undergraduate 20 22 24 
Master 2 1 3 
Total 40 40 80 
Table 4. Participants by Age 
Gender 
Group 
Total Treatment Control 
Under 30  4 3 7 
31 – 45 18 23 41 
45 – 55 12 10 22 
Over 55 6 4 10 
Total 40 40 80 
RESULTS 
The first hypothesis (H1) was that the groups 
who received training in performance measure-
ment (Groups A1 and A2) would differ from 
Table 1. Experimental Groups 
 Knowledgeable Unknowledgeable 
Common measures Group A1 Group B1 
Both common and unique measures Group A2 Group B2 
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those who did not receive training when apprais-
ing performance. Results of a MANOVA (Multi-
variate) analysis showed statistical differences 
between the knowledgeable and unknowledgea-
ble groups in their appraisal decisions. This was 
indicated by an F-value of 37.5, significant at p 
< 0.001 (see Table 5). 
Table 5.  Knowledgeable versus Unknowledge-
able 
Dependent variable Mean Sq. F Sig 
Decision performance 0.841 37.465 .000 
The decision 11.025 44.807 .000 
 
In the second hypothesis (H2), the test com-
pared the budget allocation decisions of the 
knowledgeable group and the unknowledgeable 
group. The reports showed that the financial tar-
gets had been met. However the non-financial 
measures were not achieved. From both of the 
hypotheses above (H1 and H2), the group that 
had the training was more likely to make a deci-
sion to maintain the same budget allocation (F = 
44.8, p < 0.001 – see Table 5). 
The third hypothesis (H3) was tested by 
comparing the performance appraisal by the 
group that had both the common and unique 
information with the appraisal of the group that 
only had the common information. There was a 
statistically significant difference between the 
groups (F = 38.9, p < 0.001 – see Table 6). 
Table 6. Common versus Common and Unique 
Information 
Dependent variable Mean Sq. F Sig 
Decision performance 0.740 38.858 .000 
The decision 9.025 35.174 .000 
 
The test of the fourth hypothesis (H4) found 
that the group with both the common and unique 
information made better budget allocation deci-
sions than the other group  (F = 35.2, p  < 0.001 
– see Table 6). 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
All of the hypotheses were supported. These 
results add to the literature on performance 
evaluation in a number of ways. Firstly, the tests 
of hypotheses 1 and 2 showed that providing 
training to decision makers will improve their 
understanding of performance measures and 
their decisions based on those measures. The 
unique measures provided for Hospital 2 in the 
experiment showed that although the budget had 
been met in financial terms, other non-financial 
targets had not been met. The “knowledgeable” 
group therefore correctly appraised the perfor-
mance as not being good enough, and decided 
not to allocate more funds in the next budget. 
Even though group B2 had the unique measures, 
they did not understand their significance, and 
therefore made their decision based on the good 
performance indicated by the common measures, 
and thus allocated more money to the next year's 
budget.  
Secondly, the tests of hypotheses 3 and 4 
showed that the provision and use of unique and 
non-financial measures helped the decision mak-
ers in their appraisal of the performance and 
decisions based on that appraisal. Educators with 
an interest in the public sector could provide 
training and work alongside those in govern-
ment-funded organizations, to help them to 
develop more informative and relevant targets 
and measures of their effectiveness in achieving 
the desired outputs and outcomes from the 
budget inputs allocated to them by local parlia-
ments. 
Some previous research used students as sur-
rogates for real decision makers. Whether they 
were valid proxies has been questioned. How-
ever, this current study, which used real decision 
makers as the subjects of the experiment, had 
similar findings to earlier studies which used the 
students as surrogates. This lends more credibil-
ity to the results of the previous studies, as it 
seems that the students were reasonably good 
proxies for the decision makers they were 
representing. A suggestion for future research is 
the researcher could add to the analysis with an 
examination of how the correlation between the 
variables is maintained.  
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ENDNOTE 
                                                          
1 One contrary finding is that of Murni and Witono (2004), who found that gender, age, education, political 
experience, experience in the House of Representatives, the ideology of their political party and the 
commission they belonged to did not significantly affect the role of the members of the local House of 
Representatives in local financial control. 
